Energy efficiency policy with pricequality discrimination
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We compare a range of energy efficiency policies in a durable good market subject to both energy-use
externalities and price-quality discrimination by a monopolist. We find that the social optimum can be
achieved with differentiated subsidies. With ad valorem subsidies, the subsidization of the high-end good
leads the monopolist to cut the quality of the low-end good. The rates should always be decreasing in
energy efficiency. With per-quality subsidies, there is no such interference and the rates can be
increasing if the externality is large enough relative to the market share of low-type consumers. Standalone instruments only achieve second-best outcomes. A minimum quality standard may be set at the
high-end of the product line if consumers are not too dissimilar, otherwise it should only target the lowend good. An energy tax should be set above the marginal external cost. Likewise, a uniform ad valorem
subsidy should be set above the subsidy that would be needed to specifically internalize energy-use
externalities. Lastly, if, as is often observed in practice, only the high-end good is to be incentivized, a
per-quality schedule should be preferred over an ad valorem one. An ad valorem tax on the high-end
good may even be preferred over an ad valorem subsidy if the externality is small enough and low-end
consumers dominate the market.
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1 Introduction
Energy efficiency has become a popular theme in the policy arena. The enthusiasm is sustained by
engineering studies (for instance Mc Kinsey & Co. (2009), to name only the most impactful) claiming that
energy efficiency is the most cost-effective way to save energy, hence internalize the multiple
externalities associated with energy use. Such externalities include carbon dioxide emissions at the
source of the climate change problem, local pollution, risks related to nuclear energy and national
concerns about the security of energy supply. They motivate implementation of numerous energy
efficiency standards, labels and subsidies across the world.4
These policies are commonly devised in highly concentrated market environments. In the US, Fisher
(2005) documents high concentration levels in appliance manufacturing, as measured by HerfindhalHirschman indexes (HHI) and the market shares of the top four firms, which systematically exceed 50%.
In France, HHI indexes are also substantially higher in the appliance and energy retrofit industries than in
other industries (Carbonnier, 2008). The French Anti-trust authority has pointed to high levels of
concentration in the heating, air conditioning and hot water industries, both at the manufacturing and
retail levels, raising suspicion over collusive practices (Conseil de la concurrence, 2006).5
Such an imperfect competition context is conducive to price-quality discrimination. The problem, first
studied by Mussa and Rosen (1978), goes as follows. A dominant firm facing consumers with
heterogeneous tastes for quality can find it optimal to restrict the provision of quality at the low-end of
the product line while at the same time increasing the price charged for high-end products. As shown by
Fisher (2005), this general economic problem can provide a supply-side explanation as to why energy
efficiency levels are too low in the economy, a phenomenon known as the energy efficiency gap (Jaffe
and Stavins, 1994).6 More recently, Houde (2013) and Spurlock (2013) in the US and Cohen et al. (2014)
in the UK found empirical evidence that appliance industries actually do discriminate among consumers
along the price and energy efficiency dimensions.
Against this background, we are interested in the following question: How do various policy instruments
compare in a market for energy efficiency subject to both energy-use externalities and price-quality
discrimination? From a normative perspective, after the Tinbergen rule, the existence of two market
failures calls for a combination of two policy instruments (Tinbergen, 1952). Interestingly, the tools
usually warranted to internalize energy-use externalities, namely energy taxes, energy efficiency
subsidies and standards, can in some ways also be used to address market power. How market failure
4

Just for the EU, 550 energy efficiency policies are referenced in the MURE database(http://www.measuresodyssee-mure.eu/)
5
The five largest firms have a 59% market share in the floor boilers sector, the three largest firms have a 80%
market share in the mural boilers sector and the four largest firms have a 90% market share in the electric heating
systems sector.
6
This is one of the few supply-side explanations. The existing literature on the energy efficiency gap tends to focus
more on demand-side explanations. For comprehensive reviews, see Sorrell (2004), Gillingham et al. (2009) and
Allcott and Greenstone (2012).
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interference change the design and merit order of these instruments is an open question. From a
positive perspective, it is also questionable how second-best policy can be designed when, due to
political constraints, only one instrument can be implemented.
Partial answers to the question can be found in the literature. A first set of papers focuses on the
instruments specifically needed to address price-quality discrimination, without consideration for
energy-use externalities. Following Mussa and Rosen (1978), Besanko et al. (1988) show in a monopoly
setting that the deadweight loss can be eliminated by ad valorem subsidies, the rate of which should be
decreasing in the quality of the product. Fischer (2005) studies the same problem in a more specific
energy efficiency context and pays specific attention to various forms of quality standards. In a
subsequent paper, the author extends her analysis to a Bertrand price and quality competition
framework (2011). Another set of papers, in line with Cremer and Thisse (1994), discuss instrument
combinations in an oligopoly setting where price-quality discrimination coexists with energy-use
externalities. Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) finds that the social optimum can be achieved by a
combination of a uniform ad valorem tax on the durable good coupled with either an emission tax or a
subsidy proportional to the environmental quality of the good. Bansal (2008) studies second-best policy
and finds that the second-best ad valorem incentive should be a subsidy if environmental damages are
high, and a tax otherwise.7
In this paper, we compare a wide range of first-best and second-best energy efficiency policies. We
integrate in a unified framework energy efficiency subsidies, minimum efficiency standards and energy
taxes. We build on the model of Fischer (2005), which features a monopoly and two consumer types
with fixed market shares.8
Our main contribution is to pay specific attention to a variety of subsidy designs. Indeed, little is known
about the properties of energy efficiency subsidies in an imperfect competition context.9 This is at odds
with the importance of the instrument in practice, perhaps the most widespread of all energy efficiency
policies. For instance in France, a tax credit has been implemented in 2005 in the residential building
sector. The program can be seen as a differentiated ad valorem subsidy. The subsidy rates, frequently
updated, were initially increasing in energy efficiency. Until recently, the subsidy rate was 15% of the
price for low-temperature boilers and 25% for more efficient condensing boilers, while the least-efficient
boilers were not eligible (Nauleau, 2014). Since 2014, only the best available technologies are eligible to
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Product differentiation has different causes in monopoly and oligopoly settings (Champsaur and Rochet, 1986). In
an oligopoly structure à la Cremer and Thisse, it results from quality-specific fixed costs which compel firms to
specialize into one single quality. In Mussa and Rosen’s monopoly model, there are no such fixed costs and product
differentiation only results from a strategy consisting in creating variety to discriminate.
8
We do not analyse energy efficiency labels because they are usually warranted to address information
asymmetries (not considered here) rather than energy-use externalities. For an analysis of energy efficiency labels
in an imperfect competition context, see Houde (2013) and Spurlock (2013). The authors model labels by supposing
that information provision change the preferences over energy efficiency for a fringe of consumers.
9
The existing literature on energy efficiency subsidies is mostly empirical and concerned with estimating the
effectiveness of and windfall gains from subsidies (Hassett and Metcalf, 1995; Grösche and Vance, 2009;
Boomhower and Davis, 2014; Nauleau, 2014). The few existing theoretical works assume perfect competition
(Giraudet and Quirion, 2008).
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a 30% subsidy rate. This can be seen as an ad valorem subsidy restricted to high-end goods. In parallel,
since 2014, all building energy efficiency measures are eligible to a reduced VAT rate, irrespective of the
energy efficiency level achieved. This program can be seen as a uniform ad valorem subsidy.
We find that in an economy subject to both energy-use externalities and price-quality discrimination, the
social optimum can be achieved with differentiated subsidies. With ad valorem subsidies, the
subsidization of the high-end good leads the monopolist to cut the quality of the low-end good. The
rates should always be decreasing in energy efficiency. With per-quality subsidies, there are no such
interference and the rates can be increasing if the externality is large enough relative to the market
share of low-type consumers. Stand-alone instruments only achieve second-best outcomes. A minimum
quality standard may be set at the high-end of the product line if consumers are not too dissimilar,
otherwise it should only target the low-end good. An energy tax should be set above the marginal
external cost. Likewise, a uniform ad valorem subsidy should be set above the subsidy that would be
needed to specifically internalize energy-use externalities. Lastly, if, as is often observed in practice, only
the high-end good is to be incentivized, a per-quality schedule should be preferred over an ad valorem
one. An ad valorem tax on the high-end good may even be preferred over an ad valorem subsidy if the
externality is small enough and low-end consumers dominate the market.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and the different market
environments. Section 3 discusses first-best policy interventions, focusing on ad valorem and per-quality
subsidies with differentiated rates. Section 4 discusses second-best policy interventions, involving
minimum quality standards, energy taxes and various single-instrument subsidies. Section 5 concludes.

2 Set-up
Model notations are outlined in Table 1, equilibrium notations are outlined in Table 2 and illustrative
equilibrium outcomes are summarized in Figure 1.

2.1 Consumer demand for energy efficiency
We build on the model of Fischer (2005). Consumers purchase durable goods which, combined with
energy, provide energy services such as light and heat. The durable goods considered here can be
appliances, light bulbs, heating systems, improvements to building envelopes (wall insulation, double
glazing windows), vehicles, etc. The goods are characterized by their energy intensity 𝜙𝑗 > 0, bounded
from above by𝛷, the energy intensity that would be chosen if energy were costless. Energy intensity is
the energy use per unit of energy service, hence the inverse of energy efficiency. Energy efficiency is the
only dimension of quality in the model (that is, quality is negatively correlated with energy intensity).10
We abstract from ancillary attributes of the goods, such as noise for appliances, aesthetics for light bulbs
or safety for cars. There are two levels of energy eﬃciency, high (h) and low (l), with 0 < 𝜙ℎ < 𝜙𝑙 < 𝛷.

10

Plourde and Bardis (1999) study the opposite model in which quality is positively correlated with energy
intensity. This is supposed to mimic the fact that for safety reasons, consumers may have a higher preference for
large, inefficient cars than for small, efficient cars. Unsurprisingly, they find opposite results to those of Fischer
(2005).
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For consumer i, the net surplus of purchasing and using good j is
𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗 ≡ βi (𝑣 − 𝑔 𝜙𝑗 ) − 𝑝𝑗

(1)

𝑣 > 0 is the annual gross utility of the energy service. It is produced with a combination of energy,
purchased at a constant price 𝑔 > 0, and the durable good 𝑗, purchased at price 𝑝𝑗 > 0.
We assume heterogeneity across the population in the valuation of energy services. This is reﬂected by
parameter βi , the cumulative discount factor for the net utility flow over the lifetime of the durable
good. Heterogeneity stems from either preferences or financial constraints. It materializes through
differences across consumers in their willingness to invest in energy efficiency and their frequency of
utilization of the goods after investment. For instance, a homeowner sensitive to the cold will be likely to
upgrade her heating system and set her thermostat at a high temperature. Both margins are in fact
identified into β𝑖 .11 For simplicity, we assume that consumers are of two types, high (h) and low (l), with
βℎ > β𝑙 .
The two types of consumers cover the market in fixed proportions 𝑛ℎ and 𝑛𝑙 , with 𝑛ℎ + 𝑛𝑙 = 1. Through
this assumption, we confine our attention to the intensive margin of investment in durable goods.
Therefore, our model is more relevant to capital maintenance investment (e.g. replacement of broken
appliances or light bulbs) than to capital enhancement investment (e.g. improvements to the building
envelope).

2.2 The firm
Energy eﬃciency is supplied at a convex increasing cost. In other words, the cost of energy intensity
c(ϕj ) is decreasing: c' < 0 and c'' > 0. We assume that−𝑐 ′ (𝛷) < 𝑔𝛽𝑙 , which guarantees separating
equilibria with interior solutions.12
We assume that the firm supplying the durable good is a monopolist. This is admittedly an extreme case
of imperfect competition. However, qualitative insights would be similar in a more general (though less
tractable) oligopoly setting, as the two approaches of Fischer (2005, 2011) illustrate.
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As discussed by Fischer, the willingness to invest v𝑖 and the discounted frequency of utilization u𝑖 could be
determined endogenously through the following net utility: 𝑣𝑖 (ui ) − ui 𝑔 𝜙𝑗 − 𝑝𝑗 . Yet thanks to the Envelope
theorem, the impact of small changes of u𝑖 on utility would be second-order compared to those of 𝜙𝑗 . As we are
primarily interested here in how firms set 𝜙𝑗 , we follow Fischer and keep utilization exogenous through βi . For a
model with endogenous frequency of utilization, see Giraudet and Houde (2014).
12
If 𝑔𝛽𝑙 ≤ −𝑐 ′ (𝛷) < 𝑔𝛽ℎ then in the equilibria studied hereafter 𝜙ℎ will be interior and 𝜙𝑙 will be a corner
solution. If −𝑐 ′ (𝛷) ≥ 𝑔𝛽ℎ there will be a pooling equilibrium with two corner solutions.
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Table 1. Model notations

Variable
𝑝ℎ ,𝑝𝑙
𝑣
𝛷, 𝜙ℎ , 𝜙𝑙
g
𝛾
𝛽ℎ , 𝛽𝑙
𝑛ℎ , 𝑛𝑙

Definition
Price of durable good
Gross utility of energy service
Energy intensity (inverse of energy efficiency)
Energy price
external cost
Flow of energy service, discounted over the
lifetime of the durable good
Share of consumers of each type (𝑛ℎ + 𝑛𝑙 = 1)

Illustrative unit
€ per durable good
€ per unit of energy service
kWh per unit of energy service
€per kWh
€ per kWh
Discounted years
Percentage

Table 2. Equilibrium notations

Market
structures

First-best
policies
Secondbest
policies

Superscript
*
M
E
ME
AA
PP
S
T
A
P
H
Q

Associated equilibrium
Social optimum
Monopoly equilibrium
Competitive equilibrium with energy-use externalities
Laissez-faire equilibrium (monopoly + energy-use externalities)
Differentiated ad valorem subsidy
Differentiated per-quality subsidy
Minimum quality standard
Energy tax
Uniform ad valorem subsidy
Uniform per-quality subsidy
Ad valorem subsidy restricted to good h
Per-quality subsidy restricted to good h

2.3 Social optimum
Let 𝛾 ≥ 0 be the constant marginal external cost of energy use. This may include environmental
pollution or energy security concerns. A benevolent social planner would maximize total surplus TS,
defined as the difference between the gross consumer surplus and the three types of costs: the energy
cost, the external cost and the production cost of the durable good.
Maximize TS = 𝑛ℎ (𝛽ℎ (𝑣 − (𝑔 + 𝛾)𝜙ℎ ) − 𝑐(𝜙ℎ )) + 𝑛𝑙 (𝛽𝑙 (𝑣 − (𝑔 + 𝛾)𝜙𝑙 ) − 𝑐(𝜙𝑙 ))
𝜙ℎ ,𝜙𝑙

The first-order conditions for total surplus maximization are (equilibrium outcomes are denoted with
superscript *):
∀i

𝜕TS
𝜕𝜙𝑖

= 0 ⟺ −𝑐 ′ (𝜙𝑖∗ ) = 𝛽𝑖 (𝑔 + 𝛾) ⟺ 𝜙𝑖∗ = −𝑐 ′

−1

(𝛽𝑖 (𝑔 + 𝛾))

The social planner would separate the two markets and allocate good i to consumer i. Optimal energy
efficiency levels would be set so that marginal production costs equate the discounted social value of
energy savings to the targeted consumer.
6

(2)

If energy-use are not internalized, energy efficiency levels are set at lower values (denoted with
superscript E): ∀𝑖 𝜙𝑖E = −𝑐 ′

−1

(𝛽𝑖 𝑔) > 𝜙𝑖∗.

2.4 Monopoly
To isolate the discrimination problem from energy-use externalities, we first suppose that the latter are
internalized. Consumers thus face social energy cost 𝑔 + 𝛾 and enjoy surplus 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗∗ ≡ βi (𝑣 − (𝑔 +
𝛾) 𝜙𝑗 ) − 𝑝𝑗 .In Section 2.5, we will study how the two market failures interfere.
2.4.1 Perfectly discriminating monopolist
A perfectly discriminating monopolist would maximize the following profit function:
Maximize 𝜋 = 𝑛ℎ (𝑝ℎ − 𝑐(𝜙ℎ )) + 𝑛𝑙 (𝑝𝑙 − 𝑐(𝜙ℎ ))
𝜙ℎ ,𝜙𝑙 ,𝑝ℎ ,𝑝𝑙

subject to individual rationality constraints (IRM): 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗∗ ≥ 0. The resulting energy efficiency levels would
be similar to those set by the social planner. Moreover, the prices of the durable goods would be set so
as to extract all consumer surplus: 𝑝𝑗 = 𝛽𝑗 (𝑣 − (𝑔 + 𝛾)𝜙j ).
2.4.2 The screening problem
More realistically, the monopolist knows the distribution of consumer types but cannot prevent
consumers h from buying the goods targeting consumers l, or cannot prevent arbitrage. A screening
problem arises: if the monopolist set price and energy efficiency levels as above, then consumers h will
purchase good l. By doing so, consumers h will enjoy a positive surplus CShl ∗= (𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )(𝑣 − (𝑔 +
𝛾)𝜙𝑙∗ ), instead of zero surplusby consuming good h.
2.4.3 Imperfectly discriminating monopolist
As demonstrated first byMussa and Rosen (1978), to prevent consumers h from purchasing good l, the
imperfectly discriminating monopolist cuts the quality of good l. This diminishes the surplus from buying
good l to consumers h, hence allows the monopolist to raise the price of good h to make consumers
indifferent between buying either good. The monopolist cannot deteriorate good l too much, though,
otherwise the profit loss from producing a low-end good is no longer compensated by the surplus
extracted from consumers h.
Formally, such an equilibrium requires the monopolist to endogenize Incentive Compatibility constraints
(IC) in addition to IR to ensure that consumers self-select into the good they are targeted for. The
monopolist maximizes profit subject to (superscript M denotes monopoly outcomes):
IRlM:β𝑙 (𝑣 − (𝑔 + 𝛾)ϕ𝑙 ) ≥ p𝑙
IRhM: βℎ (𝑣 − (𝑔 + 𝛾)ϕℎ ) ≥ pℎ
IClM: β𝑙 (𝑣 − (𝑔 + 𝛾)ϕ𝑙 ) − p𝑙 ≥ β𝑙 (𝑣 − (𝑔 + 𝛾)ϕℎ ) − pℎ
IChM: βℎ (𝑣 − (𝑔 + 𝛾)ϕℎ ) − pℎ ≥ βℎ (𝑣 − (𝑔 + 𝛾)ϕ𝑙 ) − p𝑙
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It can be shown that only IRl and ICh will bind. That is, consumer l is left with no surplus and consumer h
is indifferent between purchasing either good (see Spurlock (2013) for a formal demonstration).
In equilibrium, the quality of good h will still be defined by Equation (2), so that
𝜙ℎ∗ = 𝜙ℎ𝑀 .
In contrast, the quality of good l will be determined by the following first-order condition:
−𝑐 ′ (𝜙𝑙M ) = (𝑔 + 𝛾) (𝛽𝑙 −

𝑛ℎ
(𝛽ℎ
𝑛𝑙

− 𝛽𝑙 ))

(3)

For 𝜙𝑙M to be interior, the right-hand side must be positive, hence:
β𝑙
βℎ

nℎ
ℎ +n𝑙

>n

= nℎ

(4)

Inequality −𝑐 ′ (𝜙𝑙M ) ≤ −𝑐 ′ (𝜙𝑙∗ ) leads to
𝜙𝑙𝑀 > 𝜙𝑙∗.
In words, imperfect discrimination generates a suboptimal level of energy efficiency, even if energy-use
externalities are fully internalized. This can be a rational explanation for the energy efficiency gap, that
is, the apparently low levels of energy efficiency in the economy (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994).
The price of good l leaves no surplus to the low-end consumer:
𝑝𝑙𝑀 = 𝛽𝑙 (𝑣 − (𝑔 + 𝛾)𝜙𝑙𝑀 )
In contrast, some surplus is left to the consumer h:
𝑝ℎ𝑀 = 𝑣𝛽𝑙 − (𝑔 + 𝛾)𝛽ℎ 𝜙ℎ𝑀 + (𝑔 + 𝛾)(𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )𝜙𝑙𝑀
The distortions on the price of good h and the quality of good l interfere. The lower the quality offered to
the low-end consumer, the smaller the surplus left to the high-end consumer:
𝑑 𝑝ℎ𝑀 ⁄𝑑 𝜙𝑙𝑀 = (𝑔 + 𝛾)(𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 ) > 0

2.5 Monopoly with energy-use externalities
If, in addition to monopoly distortions, energy-use externalities are not internalized, a new equilibrium is
reached. Equilibrium outcomes (denoted with superscript ME) can easily be visualized by setting 𝛾=0 in
Equations (2) and (3). Energy efficiency is undersupplied at the high-end of the product line:
𝜙ℎ𝑀𝐸 = 𝜙ℎ𝐸 > 𝜙ℎ∗ = 𝜙ℎ𝑀
The same effect occurs at the low-end of the product line, where the two market failures reinforce each
other:
𝜙𝑙𝑀𝐸 > 𝜙𝑙𝐸 > 𝜙𝑙∗ and 𝜙𝑙𝑀𝐸 > 𝜙𝑙𝑀 > 𝜙𝑙∗
8

Which stand-alone market failure has the largest effect on the degradation of good l is ambiguous.
Discrimination has a smaller impact if and only if:
𝜙𝑙𝑀 > 𝜙𝑙𝐸 ⟺

β𝑙
βℎ

> nℎ (1 +

𝑔n𝑙
)
𝛾+𝑔nℎ

(5)

Since the discrimination problem has no impact on the level of good h, this condition is also a sufficient
one for the discrimination problem to generate a smaller deadweight loss than the externality problem.
Note that the right-hand side is greater than nℎ . That is, Condition (5) is more restrictive than Condition
(4) in that it requires less heterogeneity across consumers.

Figure 1: Illustrative quality levels under different market structures. Energy intensity increases rightward and energy efficiency
increases leftward. Note that 𝜙𝑙𝐸 needs not be more energy-efficient than 𝜙𝑙𝑀 ; this depends on Condition (5). Likewise, 𝜙ℎ𝑀𝐸
needs not be more energy-efficient than 𝜙𝑙∗ ; this depends on Condition (19).

3 First-best policies with two instruments
We now consider an institution in charge of regulating the imperfectly discriminating monopolist, subject
to energy-use externalities. The monopolist and the regulator are assumed to share the same level of
information. The regulator seeks to decentralize the energy efficiency pair from its laissez-faire level
(𝜙ℎ𝑀𝐸 , 𝜙𝑙𝑀𝐸 ) to its socially optimal one (𝜙ℎ∗ , 𝜙𝑙∗ ).
After the Tinbergen rule, the regulator should employ two policy instruments to address the two market
failures. This can be done in many different ways. The regulator can combine what we shall call “pure
instruments,” that is, policies with only one instrument variable. Such instruments include quality
standards (e.g. minimum or average), energy taxes, or uniform energy efficiency subsidies. Perhaps the
most intuitive intervention is to combine a minimum quality standard equal to 𝜙𝑙∗ (meant to address the
discrimination problem) and an energy tax equal to 𝛾 (meant to address the externality problem).
Alternatively, the regulator can use “differentiated instruments,” that is, policies that accommodate
several instrument variables. In the context of the model, where energy efficiency is undersupplied, this
can be achieved through differentiated subsidies.13
In this section, we focus on two main types of subsidy design: per-quality and ad valorem. Throughout,
we consider a partial equilibrium setting in which subsidies are funded by lump-sum taxes. We assume
that the subsidies are received by the consumers, but the results would be the same if they were
received by the firm.

13

Note that there could be other justifications for subsidy implementation than the two market failures considered
here. Subsidies may for instance be warranted if the adoption of energy efficient technologies generates positive
externalities.

9

3.1 Per-quality subsidies
The regulator can offer subsidy payments that depend on the energy efficiency level of the durable good
purchased by the consumer.14 Such an incentive can be modeled as a two-stage game played by a
principal, the regulator, and an agent, the monopolist. In the second stage of the game, the monopolist
takes policy parameters as given and sets price and energy eﬃciency levels so as to maximize proﬁt
under the consumers’ individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints. Using backward
induction, resolution of the second stage gives equilibrium outcomes as functions of the policy
parameters. In the ﬁrst stage of the game, the regulator sets policy parameters so as to maximize total
surplus.
3.1.1 Second stage: monopolist’s response to the policy
Consumers are offered a payment (𝑧𝑖 − ϕi )σi for purchasing good i, with σi the per-quality subsidyrate.
𝑧𝑖 > ϕi is an energy-intensity reference level, higher than the market equilibria, below which consumers
receive the payment. It disappears in the first-order conditions so it does not change the product prices
and efficiencies. The monopolist maximizes profit subject to (equilibrium outcomes are denoted with
superscript PP):
IRlPP: βl (v − gϕl ) + (ϕl − 𝑧𝑙 )σl ≥ pl
IRhPP: βh (v − gϕh ) + (ϕh − 𝑧ℎ )σh ≥ ph
IClPP: βl (v − gϕl ) + (ϕl − 𝑧𝑙 )σl − pl ≥ βl (v − gϕh ) + (ϕh −𝑧ℎ )σh − ph
IChPP: βh (v − gϕh ) + (ϕh − 𝑧ℎ )σh − ph ≥ βh (v − gϕl ) + (ϕl − 𝑧𝑙 )σl − pl
With binding IRlPPand IChPPconstraints, equilibrium efficiency levels are determined by the following firstorder conditions:
−c′(ϕPP
h ) = σh + gβh
−c′(ϕPP
l ) = g (βl −

nh
(βh
nl

(6)
− βl )) + σl

(7)

Per-quality subsidies raise both the energy efficiency (d𝜙i𝑃𝑃 ⁄d𝜎i = − 1⁄c′′ < 0) and price (dp𝑃𝑃
i ⁄d𝜎i =
𝑔𝛽i > 0) levels of the good they specifically target. While a subsidy on good h does not change the price
of good l (dpPP
l ⁄dσh = 0), a subsidy on good l reduces the price of good h:
dpPP
h
= −g(βh − βl ) < 0
dσl

14

The closest practical experience we can think of is the feebate system currently implemented in the automobile
sector in various countries (e.g. France, Canada, the Netherlands and Norway). The feebate system combines taxes
and subsidies, the amount of which depends on the energy efficiency level of the car purchased, regardless of its
price (d’Haultfoeuille et al., 2013).
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This is because with σl , the more efficient good l would provide consumer h with a higher surplus, would
this consumer buy that good. The monopolist thus responds by lowering the price of l to keep consumer
h indifferent between buying either good. In contrast, the provision of good l is not affected by σl , so the
monopolist does not need to change the price of good l.
3.1.2 First stage: Regulator’s intervention.
The regulator seeks the subsidy rates that maximize total surplus, taking into account energy-use
externalities. This leads to the same first-order conditions for both goods:
∀i ni [−(g + γ)βi − c′(ϕPP
i )]

dϕPP
i
dσi

=0

(8)

Since d𝜙i𝑃𝑃 ⁄d𝜎i < 0, both subsidies will implement the socially optimal energy efficiency levels:
∀i − c′(ϕPP
i ) = (g + γ)βi

(9)

By matching the right-hand side of Equation (9) with that of Equation (6), we derive the optimal subsidy
rate on good h to correct the two market failures:
σPP
h = βh γ
By matching the right-hand side of Equation (9) with that of Equation (7), we obtain the optimal subsidy
rate on good l:
σPP
l = β𝑙 𝛾 + g

𝑛ℎ
(β − β𝑙 )
𝑛𝑙 ℎ

3.1.3 Comments
Subsidy rates 𝜎ℎPP and 𝜎𝑙PP can be decomposed into two additive components. The β𝑖 𝛾 terms are the
components needed to internalize the energy-use externality. The second term in each subsidy formula
(zero for𝜎ℎPPand g(βℎ − β𝑙 ) 𝑛ℎ ⁄𝑛𝑙 in 𝜎𝑙𝑃𝑃 ) is the one needed to address the discrimination problem.
Which subsidy rate should be higher is not straightforward. It depends on:
𝜎ℎPP > 𝜎𝑙PP ⟺

𝛾 𝑛ℎ
>
𝑔 𝑛𝑙

The externality must be large and/or the market share of the high-end consumers must be small for the
subsidy rates to be increasing in energy efficiency. To put this condition in perspective, current estimates
of the implicit carbon price in OECD countries typically range in the 10% of domestic energy price,
hence γ/g ≈ 0.1. In such a market environment, the market share of the high-end consumers should be
no larger than 11% for the optimal subsidy schedule to be increasing in energy efficiency. In practice, the
subsidy schedules tend to be increasing in energy efficiency (e.g. the French tax credit program until
2013).
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3.2 Ad valorem subsidies
An alternative to relating subsidy rates to the quality of the durable goods is to link them to the price of
the goods. Such a subsidization schedule prevails in many countries (e.g. the French tax credit program
introduced above). For instance in Germany, the KFW subsidization program for residential building
retrofitting offers a 10% price cut if the retrofitted building reaches 115% of the standard energy needs
for new constructions, and a 25% price cut if it meets the Passivhaus standard (Rüdinger, 2013). Again,
such an instrument is modeled here within a principal-agent framework.
3.2.1 Second stage: monopolist’s response to the policy
We consider ad valorem subsidies of rate 𝜖𝑖 to good i. 𝑝𝑖 denotes producer prices while p𝑖 (1 − 𝜖𝑖 )
denotes consumer prices. The monopolist maximizes profit subject to
IRlAA:β𝑙 (𝑣 − 𝑔ϕ𝑙 ) ≥ p𝑙 (1 − 𝜖𝑙 )
IRhAA: βℎ (𝑣 − 𝑔ϕℎ ) ≥ pℎ (1 − 𝜖ℎ )
IClAA: β𝑙 (𝑣 − 𝑔ϕ𝑙 ) − p𝑙 (1 − 𝜖𝑙 ) ≥ β𝑙 (𝑣 − 𝑔ϕℎ ) − pℎ (1 − 𝜖ℎ )
IChAA: βℎ (𝑣 − 𝑔ϕℎ ) − pℎ (1 − 𝜖ℎ ) ≥ βℎ (𝑣 − 𝑔ϕ𝑙 ) − p𝑙 (1 − 𝜖𝑙 )
Under binding IRlAA and IChAA constraints, profit maximization leads to the following energy efficiency
levels:
−𝑐′(𝜙ℎ𝐴𝐴 ) = 𝑔
−𝑐′(𝜙𝑙AA ) = 𝑔

𝛽𝑙
1−𝜖𝑙

𝛽ℎ
1−𝜖ℎ

−

(10)

𝑛ℎ 𝛽ℎ −𝛽𝑙
𝑛𝑙 1−𝜖ℎ

(11)

Like per-quality subsidies, ad valorem subsidies increase the energy efficiency of the good they
specifically target:
∀i

𝑑𝜙𝑖AA
𝑑𝜖𝑖

=

−𝑔𝛽𝑖

(1−𝜖𝑖 )2 𝑐 ′′ [𝜙𝑖AA ]

<0

(12)

Yet unlike per-quality subsidies, ad valorem subsidies entail some interference. The subsidy on good h
indeed deteriorates the quality of good l:
𝑑𝜙𝑙AA
𝑑𝜖ℎ

=

𝑛ℎ
𝑔(𝛽ℎ −𝛽𝑙 )
𝑛𝑙 𝑐 ′′ [𝜙𝑙AA ](1−𝜖ℎ )2

>0

(13)

This is because of the two channels that can be used by the monopolist to maximize profit, namely cut
𝜙𝑙 or increase 𝑝ℎ , an ad valorem subsidy makes the latter costlier. The monopolist therefore harnesses
the former.
The effect of ad valorem subsidies on the prices of the durable goods is more subtle than that of perquality subsidies. This is detailed in Appendix 1.
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3.2.2 First stage: Regulator’s intervention.
The regulator seeks the subsidy levels that maximize total surplus, taking into account energy-use
externalities. The first-order conditions for maximization are:
nh [−(g + γ)βh − c′(ϕAA
h )]

dϕAA
h
dϵh

+ nl [−(g + γ)βl − c′(ϕAA
l )]

nl [−(g + γ)βl − c′(ϕAA
l )]

dϕAA
l
dϵl

dϕAA
l
dϵh

=0

=0

(14)
(15)

Since 𝑑𝜙𝑙AA⁄𝑑𝜖𝑙 > 0, Equation (15) simplifies to:
−c ′ (ϕAA
l ) = (g + γ)βl

(16)

This implies that the efficiency of good l will be set at its optimal level. This result, introduced in equation
(14) and combined with the fact that 𝑑𝜙ℎAA⁄𝑑𝜖ℎ < 0 implies that good h will also be set at its optimal
level:
−c ′ (ϕAA
h ) = (g + γ)βh

(17)

By matching the right-hand side of Equation (17) with that of Equation (10), we derive the optimal
subsidy rate on good h to correct the two market failures:
𝜖ℎ𝐴𝐴 =

𝛾
𝑔+𝛾

Using this and matching the right-hand side of Equation (16) with that of Equation (11), we derive the
optimal subsidy rate on good l:
𝜖𝑙AA =

𝑛ℎ (𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 ) +

𝛾
𝑛𝛽
𝑔+𝛾 𝑙 𝑙

𝑛ℎ (𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 ) + 𝑛𝑙 𝛽𝑙

3.2.3 Comments
Ad valorem subsidies differ from per-quality subsidies in two ways. First, they cannot systematically be
decomposed into two additive components meant to specifically address one market failure. If
discrimination were the only market failure to address (𝛾 = 0), the subsidy rate would be nil on good h
(𝜖ℎM = 0) and equal to 𝜖𝑙M = 𝑛ℎ (𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )/[𝑛ℎ (𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 ) + 𝑛𝑙 𝛽𝑙 ] on good l. Reciprocally, if energy-use
externalities were the only market failure to internalize, energy efficiency levels would be set so that
equilibrium levels with the subsidy (defined by −𝑐′ = gβi /(1 − ϵi )) match the socially optimal ones
(defined by −𝑐 ′ = (g + 𝛾)βi ). Hence, both goods would need to be subsidized at the same uniform
rate𝜖 = 𝛾/[𝛾 + 𝑔]. With these definitions, 𝜖ℎAA = 𝜖 𝐸 + 𝜖ℎM and:
𝜖𝑙AA = 𝜖 𝐸 + 𝜖𝑙M − 𝜖𝑙M 𝜖 𝐸 = 𝜖 𝐸 + 𝜖𝑙M (1 − 𝜖ℎAA )
In other words, if the two market failures are to be jointly corrected, the subsidy rates specifically
needed for each market failure are additive on good h but sub-additive on good l. Indeed, since the
subsidy on good h deteriorates the efficiency of good l, the subsidy on good l needs to be higher.
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A second difference between ad valorem subsidies and per-quality ones it that with the former, subsidy
rates should always be larger on good than on good h: 𝜖ℎAA < 𝜖𝑙AA. An intuition for this result is that
efficiency of good h must increase only to internalize the externality, while the efficiency of good l must
increase to also correct the distortion due to imperfect discrimination. Yet the fact that subsidy rates
should always be larger on good l does not mean that good l necessarily receives a larger amount of
subsidies per unit sold, since it is cheaper than good h and subsidies are ad valorem. In other words,
𝑝ℎAA 𝜖ℎAA may be higher or lower than 𝑝𝑙AA 𝜖𝑙AA .

4 Second-best policies with one instrument
In practice, the Tinbergen rule is rarely applied. For a variety of informational, institutional or political
reasons, there are seldom as many policy instruments as there are market failures to correct.15 In the
context we are interested in, for instance, implementing differentiated subsidy rates would open room
for lobbying from industrial firms.
In this section, we therefore take a more positive view and examine how single instruments perform in
the context of two market failures. In addition to classical minimum quality standards and energy tax, we
examine several forms of single-instrument energy efficiency subsidies.

4.1 Minimum quality standard
This instrument is widely applied worldwide. Most European countries and some US states have
implemented minimum quality standards for new buildings after the oil shocks of the 1970s, and have
strengthened them since then. The main appliances, as well as electric motors and lighting equipment
are also covered by energy efficiency standards in most of the developed and transition countries.
Let us consider the effect of a standard (denoted S) on each good i, independently of the other good. The
deadweight loss of a standard ϕ𝑆 on good i is:
𝐷𝑊𝐿𝑖 = 𝑛𝑖 [(𝑔 + 𝛾)𝛽𝑖 (ϕ𝑆 − ϕ∗𝑖 ) + 𝑐(ϕ𝑆 ) − 𝑐(ϕ∗𝑖 )]
It varies with ϕ𝑆 in an ambiguous manner:
𝑑𝐷𝑊𝐿𝑖
𝑑ϕ𝑆

< 0 𝑖𝑓 ϕ∗𝑖 < ϕ𝑆 ≤ 𝛷
= 𝑛𝑖 [(𝑔 + 𝛾)𝛽𝑖 + 𝑐′(ϕ𝑆 )] { = 0 𝑖𝑓 ϕ𝑆 = ϕ∗𝑖
> 0 𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ ϕ𝑆 < ϕ∗𝑖

(18)

That is, tightening the standard is welfare-improving, up to the point that the socially optimal value of
the good is reached. Beyond that point, further tightening the standard is socially detrimental. The
question of interest now is: should the standard constrain the efficiency of both goods (pooling
standard) or that of good l only (separating standard)?

15

To quote Tinbergen himself, “Economists or economic politicians holding the opinion that there is such a one-byone correspondence between targets and instruments evidently assume a very special structure.” (Tinbergen,
1952, note 1, p. 31).
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4.1.1 A necessary and sufficient condition for a pooling standard
An optimal pooling standard would minimize the sum of the deadweight losses on each of the two
goods. This leads to the following first-order condition:
−𝑐 ′ (ϕ𝑆 ) = (𝑛ℎ 𝛽ℎ + 𝑛𝑙 𝛽𝑙 )(𝑔 + 𝛾)
The pooling standard would be optimal to a consumer of average type 𝑛ℎ 𝛽ℎ + 𝑛𝑙 𝛽𝑙 . To be effective, such
a standard should be more stringent than the monopolist's supply of good h: ϕ𝑆 ≤ ϕ𝑀𝐸
ℎ . This is true if
′−1
′−1
and only if 𝑐 (−(𝑔 + 𝛾)(𝑛ℎ 𝛽ℎ + 𝑛𝑙 𝛽𝑙 )) ≤ 𝑐 (−𝑔𝛽ℎ ), that is:
𝛽ℎ
𝑛ℎ 𝛽ℎ +𝑛𝑙 𝛽𝑙

≤1+

𝛾
𝑔

(19)

4.1.2 A sufficient condition for a pooling standard
∗
∗
If the externality is so large that ϕ𝑀𝐸
ℎ ≥ ϕ𝑙 then the standard, at least equal to ϕ𝑙 , is necessarily more
∗
′−1 (−(𝑔
stringent than ϕ𝑀𝐸
+ 𝛾)𝛽𝑙 ) ≤ 𝑐 ′−1 (−𝑔𝛽ℎ ), which leads to the
ℎ ≥ ϕ𝑙 . This occurs when𝑐
sufficient condition for a pooling standard:
𝛽ℎ
𝛾
≤1+
𝛽𝑙
𝑔
Obviously, this condition implies Condition (19).
4.1.3 Separating standard
If Condition (19) is not satisfied, ϕ𝑆 > ϕ𝑀𝐸
ℎ . It is not optimal for the monopolist to supply only one good
𝑆
of efficiency ϕ . The monopolist could increase the profit earned from consumers h by extending its
product line to includeϕ𝑀𝐸
ℎ . With this new constraint, the only way to minimize the total deadweight loss
is to eliminate the deadweight loss from good l. After Equation (18), this can only be done by setting the
standard at ϕ∗𝑙 .

4.2 Energy tax
This instrument is also widely applied. Most European countries, Japan and a few other countries have
implemented fuel taxes in the transport sector. These taxes were found to efficiently restrain fuel
demand (Sterner 2007).
Energy taxes here are assumed to be funded by lump-sum subsidies.
4.2.1 Second stage: Monopolist’s response
A tax on energy at rate t would lead to the following first-order conditions (superscript T denotes
equilibrium outcomes):
−𝑐 ′ (ϕ𝑇ℎ ) = (𝑔 + 𝑡)𝛽ℎ
−𝑐 ′ (ϕ𝑇𝑙 ) = (𝑔 + 𝑡) (𝛽𝑙 −

𝑛ℎ
(𝛽ℎ
𝑛𝑙

(20)
− 𝛽𝑙 ))

The tax would increase the energy efficiency of the two goods:
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(21)

𝑑ϕ𝑇ℎ
−𝛽ℎ
=
<0
𝑑𝑡
𝑐′′(ϕ𝑇ℎ )
𝑑ϕ𝑇𝑙
−1
𝑛ℎ
=
(𝛽𝑙 − (𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )) < 0
𝑇
𝑑𝑡
𝑛𝑙
𝑐′′(ϕ𝑙 )
As discussed in Appendix 2, the tax has an ambiguous effect on product prices.
4.2.2 First stage: Regulator’s intervention
The optimal tax rate to address the two market failures is the one that maximizes social welfare,
including energy-use externalities. This leads to the following first-order condition:
nh [−(g + γ)βh − c′(ϕTh )]

dϕTh
dϕTl
+ nl [−(g + γ)βl − c′(ϕTl )]
=0
dt
dt

Identifying the 𝑐 ′ (ϕ𝑇𝑖 ) with the right-hand sides in Equations (20) and (21), we end-up with the following
equality:
𝑡=𝛾+

(𝑔 + 𝛾)𝑛ℎ (𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 ) 𝑑ϕ𝑇𝑙 ⁄𝑑𝑡
𝑛ℎ 𝛽ℎ 𝑑ϕ𝑇ℎ ⁄𝑑𝑡 + (𝑛𝑙 𝛽𝑙 − 𝑛ℎ (𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )) 𝑑ϕ𝑇𝑙 ⁄𝑑𝑡

>𝛾

Unless the two consumers are identical (βh = βl ), the optimal tax rate is larger than γ. If it were equal to
γ, external costs would be internalized but there would still remain some deadweight loss from pricequality discrimination. Further energy taxation could reduce the deadweight loss on the quality of good l,
up to the point that the marginal welfare gains are offset by the marginal welfare loss of an inefficiently
high quality of good h.
This result differs from Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) who finds a second-best tax equal to the social
valuation of the externality γ. Besides, both results differ from the classical one in the environmental
economics literature that under full information, homogeneous goods and oligopolies with symmetric
ﬁrms, the second-best tax should be smaller than the externality so as to balance the output contraction
eﬀect of the tax (Baumol 1988). However, such an effect could not occur in our model, which does not
accommodate the extensive margin of investment.

4.3 Subsidies
Overall, six types of single-instrument subsidies can be thought of. Subsidy rates can target uniformly
both goods or specifically either of the two goods. In each case, the rates can be ad valorem or perquality.
Much of the analysis carried out in Section 3 carries over to the second-best analysis. The monopolist’s
responses to each of these instruments have already been analyzed in the second stages of the games.
The difference in the second-best setting is that in the first stage of the games, the regulator maximizes
total surplus with respect to one instrument variable only.
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For subsidies specifically targeting the low-end good (either ad valorem or per-quality) and per-quality
subsidies targeting the high-end good, the analysis directly derives from Section 3. Recall from the
second stages of the games that these subsidies do not interfere with the good they are not targeted for.
Therefore, in a second-best setting, the best the regulator can do is to set their rates at their socially
optimal level.
More analysis is needed for uniform subsidies (either ad valorem or per-quality) and ad valorem
subsidies on the high-end good, which is the object of the present section.
4.3.1 Uniform ad valorem subsidies
Such a policy is perhaps the most widespread. For instance in France, home energy retrofits benefit from
a reduced VAT rate (5% against a normal rate of 20%), irrespective of the level of energy savings
achieved.
The monopolist’s response to a uniform ad valorem subsidy rate 𝜖 is directly given by Equations (10) and
(11), with 𝜖ℎ = 𝜖𝑙 ≡ 𝜖. The comparative statics of equilibrium efficiencies is (superscript A denotes
equilibrium outcomes):
𝑑ϕℎ𝐴
−𝑔𝛽ℎ
=
<0
𝑑𝜖
𝑐′′(ϕℎ𝐴 )(1 − 𝜖)2
𝑑ϕ𝑙𝐴
−𝑔
𝑛ℎ
=
(𝛽𝑙 − (𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )) < 0
𝐴
2
𝑑𝜖
𝑛𝑙
𝑐′′(ϕ𝑙 )(1 − 𝜖)
In the first stage of the game, by the same type of reasoning as for the tax, the regulator will set the
subsidy at a larger rate than the one needed to specifically internalize energy-use externalities:
𝜖=

𝛾
𝑔
𝑛ℎ (𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 ) 𝑑ϕ𝑙𝐴 ⁄𝑑𝜖
𝛾
(1 +
)>
𝐴
𝐴
𝑔+𝛾
𝛾 𝑛ℎ 𝛽ℎ 𝑑ϕℎ ⁄𝑑𝜖 + 𝑛𝑙 𝛽𝑙 𝑑ϕ𝑙 ⁄𝑑𝜖
𝑔+𝛾

It can be shown that with a more restrictive quadratic cost assumption, both this subsidy and the energy
tax lead to the same equilibrium outcome. Consumer h’s surplus and profits are then higher with this
subsidy than with the energy tax.
4.3.2 Ad valorem subsidy on the high-end good
The recent evolution of the French tax credit program resembles such an instrument. Only the best
available technologies are incentivized (e.g. condensing boilers, etc.) with a 30% price cut.
Recall from Section 3.2.1 that an ad valorem subsidy on good h deteriorates the quality of good l
(𝑑ϕ𝐻
𝑙 ⁄𝑑𝜖ℎ > 0, where superscript H denotes equilibrium outcomes). Therefore, here, in equilibrium the
quality of good h will be below its socially optimal level ϕ∗ℎ and the quality of good l will be even below its
laissez-faire level ϕ𝑀𝐸
𝑙 .
With the same type of reasoning as with the tax, in the first stage of the game the regulator sets the ad
valorem incentive at the following rate:
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𝜖ℎ𝐻 =

𝐻
𝛾𝑛ℎ 𝛽ℎ 𝑑ϕ𝐻
ℎ ⁄𝑑𝜖ℎ + (𝛾𝑛𝑙 𝛽𝑙 + 𝑔𝑛ℎ (𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )) 𝑑ϕ𝑙 ⁄𝑑𝜖ℎ
𝐻
(𝛾 + 𝑔)𝑛ℎ 𝛽ℎ 𝑑ϕ𝐻
ℎ ⁄𝑑𝜖ℎ + (𝛾𝑛𝑙 𝛽𝑙 + 𝑔𝑛ℎ (𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )) 𝑑ϕ𝑙 ⁄𝑑𝜖ℎ

Since the 𝑑ϕ𝐻
𝑖 ⁄𝑑𝜖ℎ have opposite signs, the sign of this expression is ambiguous. If it is negative, a tax on
good h would be preferred over a subsidy. This occurs if and only if the numerator and the denominator
have opposite signs. Since the denominator is smaller than the numerator, this condition is equivalent to
having a positive numerator and a negative denominator. Therefore:
𝜖ℎ𝐻 < 0 ↔ 0 < 𝛾𝑛ℎ 𝛽ℎ

𝑑ϕ𝐻
ℎ
𝑑𝜖ℎ

𝑑ϕ𝐻

+ (𝛾𝑛𝑙 𝛽𝑙 + 𝑔𝑛ℎ (𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )) 𝑑𝜖 𝑙 < −𝑔𝑛ℎ 𝛽ℎ
ℎ

𝑑ϕ𝐻
ℎ
𝑑𝜖ℎ

(22)

This condition is likely to hold if 𝛾 is small enough and type l consumers dominate the market. To see
this, assume 𝛾 is negligible. The condition boils down to:
0 <1−

𝛽𝑙
𝑑ϕ𝐻
𝑛𝑙 𝛽ℎ 𝑐 ′′ (ϕ𝐻
ℎ ⁄𝑑𝜖ℎ
𝑙 )
<− 𝐻
=
′′
𝛽ℎ
𝑑ϕ𝑙 ⁄𝑑𝜖ℎ 𝑛ℎ 𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 𝑐 (ϕ𝐻
ℎ)

𝐻
We know from Equations (10) and (11) that ϕ𝐻
𝑙 > ϕℎ , but without further assumptions on c’’’(.), we do
𝐻
′′
not know how 𝑐 ′′ (ϕ𝐻
𝑙 )⁄𝑐 (ϕℎ ) compares to 1. Still, if 𝑛𝑙 is sufficiently larger than 𝑛ℎ , the right-hand
side of the inequality will be larger than 1 and the inequality will be satisfied.

This outcome can be rationalized as follows. If the externality is very small, then the high-end good is
very close to its socially optimal level, while the low-end good is very far from its socially optimal level.
Therefore, the tax has a first-order effect on good l but only a second-order effect on good h. In other
words, with the tax, the marginal welfare gain from improving good l is larger than the marginal welfare
loss from deteriorating good h. The fact that 𝑛𝑙 is larger than 𝑛ℎ only amplifies this effect.
It should be kept in mind though that having a small 𝛾 and a large 𝑛𝑙 is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for the optimal incentive to be a tax. Clearer conditions can be derived using a more
restrictive quadratic cost assumption. Hence, the second derivative of cost is constant so the last fraction
drops from the inequality, which becomes:
𝛽𝑙 2 𝛽𝑙
𝛽𝑙 2
𝛽𝑙 2 𝛽𝑙
𝛾𝑛𝑙 [(1 − ) + ] < 𝑔𝑛ℎ (1 − ) < 𝛾𝑛𝑙 [(1 − ) + ] + 𝑔𝑛𝑙
𝛽ℎ
𝛽ℎ
𝛽ℎ
𝛽ℎ
𝛽ℎ
The interior condition 𝛽𝑙 ⁄𝛽ℎ ≥ 𝑛ℎ implies 𝑔𝑛𝑙 ≥ 𝑔𝑛ℎ (1 − 𝛽𝑙 ⁄𝛽ℎ )2 , hence the right inequality.
Therefore, with quadratic costs, the left inequality right above is sufficient for the incentive to be a tax.
4.3.3 Per-quality subsidy on the high-end good
In France, a 1,350€ subsidy on energy efficiency investment was introduced in 2014 for middle- and lowincome households undergoing home energy retrofit works. The program has similar eligibility
requirements as the most recent version of the tax credit program. It can be seen as a per-quality
subsidy on the most energy efficient goods.
With a per-quality subsidy on good h, the quality of good h will be socially optimal (ϕ∗ℎ ) and the quality of
good l will be unchanged (ϕ𝑀𝐸
𝑙 ). This instrument therefore strictly dominates the second-best ad
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valorem subsidy on good h, which brings both goods to lower quality levels. Yet if the ad valorem subsidy
turns out to be a tax (under Condition (22)), the comparison with the per-quality subsidy is no longer
obvious. According to the comparative statics of quality levels with respect to 𝜖ℎ (Equations (12) and
(13)), the tax will push the quality of good h away from its socially optimal level (which is worse than the
per-quality equivalent) but bring the quality of good l closer to its socially optimal level (which is better
than the per-quality equivalent). In Appendix 3, we confine our attention to quadratic costs and further
discuss the conditions under which one instrument dominates the other. Overall, this result contributes
to the literature comparing ad valorem and per-quality instrument (Keen 1998).
4.3.4 Uniform per-quality subsidies
The monopolist’s response to such a subsidy is the same as the one described in Section 3.1.1. By the
same reasoning as before, the regulator will set the uniform per-quality tax at the following level:
𝜎 𝑃 = 𝜎ℎ𝑃𝑃

𝑛ℎ 𝑑ϕ𝑃ℎ /𝑑𝜎
𝑛𝑙 𝑑ϕ𝑃𝑙 /𝑑𝜎
𝑃𝑃
+
𝜎
< 𝜎ℎ𝑃𝑃 + 𝜎𝑙𝑃𝑃
𝑙
𝑛ℎ 𝑑ϕ𝑃ℎ ⁄𝑑𝜎 + 𝑛𝑙 𝑑ϕ𝑃𝑙 ⁄𝑑𝜎
𝑛ℎ 𝑑ϕ𝑃ℎ ⁄𝑑𝜎 + 𝑛𝑙 𝑑ϕ𝑃𝑙 ⁄𝑑𝜎

The payment to consumers is lower than the one that would be needed to address the two externalities
(𝜎ℎ𝑃𝑃 + 𝜎𝑙𝑃𝑃 ).

5 Conclusions
Energy efficiency markets are commonly subject to both energy-use externalities and price-quality
discrimination. How do energy efficiency policy instruments compare in such a market environment? To
answer this question, we have examined a broad set of first-best and second-best policy interventions in
a unified framework. We have paid particular attention to energy efficiency subsidies, an instrument
frequently encountered in practice but, by contrast, little studied in the market environment considered
here. We have built on the model of Fischer (2005), which features two types of consumers, a
monopolist which can imperfectly price discriminate and two levels of energy efficiency which are
positively correlated with quality.
From a normative perspective, the two levels of energy efficiency are undersupplied in laissez-faire. This
so-called energy efficiency gap can be addressed with energy efficiency subsidies, the rate of which is
differentiated across energy efficient goods. Subsidy schedules can be either per-quality or ad valorem,
with different consequences. We find that with ad valorem subsidies, the rate on the more energy
efficient goods interferes with the provision of less energy efficient goods. The rates should always be
decreasing in energy efficiency. With per-quality subsidies, there are no such interferences and the rates
can be increasing if the marginal external cost of energy use is large enough relative to the market share
of low-type consumers. This is at odds with actual practice in which differentiated subsidies tend to be
ad valorem with increasing rates.
From a positive perspective, for a variety of informational, institutional or political reasons, single
instruments are more likely to be implemented. We find that a minimum quality standard may be set at
the high-end of the product line if consumers are not too dissimilar. An energy tax on energy should be
set above the marginal external cost of energy use. Similarly, a uniform ad valorem subsidy should be set
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above the subsidy that would be needed to specifically internalize energy-use externalities. Lastly, if, as is
often observed in practice, only the high-end good is to be incentivized, a per-quality schedule should be
preferred over an ad valorem one. An ad valorem tax may even be preferred over an ad valorem subsidy
if the externality is small enough and low-end consumers dominate the market.
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APPENDIX 1: Effect of ad valorem subsidies on product prices
Equilibrium prices are:
𝑝𝑙𝐴𝐴 =
𝑝ℎ𝐴𝐴

𝛽𝑙 (𝑣 − 𝑔𝜑𝑙𝐴𝐴 )
1 − 𝜖𝑙

𝑔𝛽ℎ (𝜑𝑙𝐴𝐴 − 𝜑ℎ𝐴𝐴 ) − 𝛽𝑙 (𝑣 − 𝑔𝜑𝑙𝐴𝐴 )
=
1 − 𝜖ℎ

Comparative statics of the price of good l is as follows:
𝑑𝑝𝑙𝐴𝐴
1
𝑑𝜑𝑙𝐴𝐴
=
(𝑝𝑙𝐴𝐴 − 𝑔𝛽𝑙
)>0
𝑑𝜖𝑙
1 − 𝜖𝑙
𝑑𝜖𝑙
𝑑𝑝𝑙𝐴𝐴
−𝑔𝛽𝑙 𝑑𝜑𝑙𝐴𝐴
=
<0
𝑑𝜖ℎ
1 − 𝜖ℎ 𝑑𝜖ℎ
Both subsidies have an opposite effect on the price of good l, which reflects their opposite effect on the
quality of good l.
The price of good h increases with 𝜑ℎ𝐴𝐴 :
𝑑𝑝ℎ𝐴𝐴
1
𝑑𝜑ℎ𝐴𝐴
𝑑𝜑𝑙𝐴𝐴
=
+ 𝑔(𝛽ℎ + 𝛽𝑙 )
(𝑝ℎ𝐴𝐴 − 𝑔𝛽ℎ
)>0
𝑑𝜖ℎ
1 − 𝜖ℎ
𝑑𝜖ℎ
𝑑𝜖ℎ
It is decreasing with 𝜑𝑙𝐴𝐴 :
𝑑𝑝ℎ𝐴𝐴 𝑔(𝛽ℎ + 𝛽𝑙 ) 𝑑𝜑𝑙𝐴𝐴
=
<0
𝑑𝜖𝑙
1 − 𝜖ℎ
𝑑𝜖𝑙
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APPENDIX 2: Effect of an energy tax on product prices
The effect of the tax on the price of good l is ambiguous. Recall that 𝑝𝑙𝑇 = 𝛽𝑙 (𝑣 − (𝑔 + 𝑡)𝜑𝑙𝑇 (𝑡)).
Differentiating, we obtain:
𝑑𝑝𝑙𝑇
𝑑𝑡

= −𝛽𝑙 𝜑𝑙𝑇 (1 + 𝜇𝑙 ) with 𝜇𝑙 =

𝑑𝜑𝑙𝑇 𝑡
𝑑𝑡 𝜑𝑙𝑇

Variable 𝜇𝑙 is the elasticity of the supply of energy efficiency with respect to the price of energy. If
−1 < 𝜇𝑙 < 0, a “normal” rebound effect occurs. If 𝜇𝑙 ≥ 0, a “backfire” rebound effect occurs. Recall that
𝑑𝜑𝑙𝑇 ⁄𝑑𝑡 is negative, hence so is 𝜇𝑙 . Therefore, 𝑑𝜑𝑙𝑇 ⁄𝑑𝑡 is negative if there is a “normal” rebound effect
and positive if there is no rebound effect (𝜇𝑙 ≤ −1).
The price of of good h will vary with even more ambiguity. Recall that
𝑝ℎ𝑇 = 𝑝𝑙𝑇 + 𝛽ℎ (𝑔 + 𝑡) (𝜑𝑙𝑇 (𝑡) − 𝜑ℎ𝑇 (𝑡)).
Differentiating and using the same elasticity formulas as before, we obtain:
𝑑𝑝ℎ𝑇
= −(𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )𝜑𝑙𝑇 (1 + 𝜇𝑙 ) − 𝛽ℎ 𝜑ℎ𝑇 (1 + 𝜇ℎ )
𝑑𝑡
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APPENDIX 3: Ad valorem versus per-quality high-end subsidy with
quadratic cost
Here we assume that:
𝑐(𝜙𝑗 ) =

(𝛷 − 𝜙𝑗 )2
2

The value of the externality above which the ad valorem incentive on good h would be a subsidy is noted
γ1:
γ1 ≡ 𝑔

𝑛ℎ (𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )2
𝑛𝑙 (𝛽ℎ2 − 𝛽ℎ 𝛽𝑙 + 𝛽𝑙2 )

Recall that the per-quality subsidy on good h improves the efficiency of good h without changing that of
good l. A natural question is how this kind of subsidy, independent from the price of the subsidized good,
compares to the ad valorem subsidy when both subsidy rates are set at their optimal level. This question
is related to the debate between specific and ad valorem taxes which has generated numerous
contributions (see Keen (1998) for a review).
In our model, the optimal per-quality subsidy rate is simply 𝛾𝛽ℎ . The difference between the ad valorem
and the per-quality subsidy on good h can be written as a two degrees polynomial of 𝛾:
∆𝐴𝐻−𝑆𝐻 =

𝑔2 𝑛ℎ3 (𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )4
𝑔𝑛ℎ2 (𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )2 (𝛽ℎ2 − 𝛽ℎ 𝛽𝑙 + 𝛽𝑙2 )
−
𝛾
2𝑛𝑙 (𝑛𝑙 𝛽ℎ2 + 𝑛ℎ (𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )2 )
𝑛𝑙 𝛽ℎ2 + 𝑛ℎ (𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )2
𝑛ℎ (𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )(𝑛ℎ 𝛽ℎ2 (𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 ) + 𝑛𝑙 𝛽𝑙 (2𝛽ℎ2 − 𝛽ℎ 𝛽𝑙 + 𝛽𝑙2 ))
− 𝛾2
2(𝑛𝑙 𝛽ℎ2 + 𝑛ℎ (𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )2 )

Without externality (𝛾 = 0), ∆𝐴𝐻−𝑆𝐻 is positive, but it decreases with 𝛾. The positive root of this
polynomial, above which∆𝐴𝐻−𝑆𝐻 is negative i.e. the per-quality subsidy performs better, is:
γ2 =

𝑔2 𝑛ℎ2 (𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )3
√𝑔2 𝑛ℎ2 𝑛𝑙 𝛽ℎ2 (𝑛𝑙 𝛽ℎ2 + 𝑛ℎ (𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )2 )(𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )2 + 𝑔𝑛ℎ 𝑛𝑙 (𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )(𝛽ℎ2 − 𝛽ℎ 𝛽𝑙 + 𝛽𝑙2 )

It can be shown that γ1 > γ2, so if γ is high enough for 𝜖ℎAH > 0 i.e. it is a subsidy, then this subsidy is
always dominated, in welfare terms, by a per-quality subsidy.
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